{"id":18800,"date":"2011-12-07T17:36:09","date_gmt":"2011-12-07T17:36:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.mixedracestudies.org\/wordpress\/?p=18800"},"modified":"2016-10-08T01:33:36","modified_gmt":"2016-10-08T01:33:36","slug":"one-%e2%80%98speck%e2%80%99-of-imperfection%e2%80%94invisible-blackness-and-the-one-drop-rule-an-interdisciplinary-approach-to-examining-plessy-v-ferguson-and-jane-doe-v-state-of-louisiana","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mixedracestudies.org\/wp\/?p=18800","title":{"rendered":"One \u2018Speck\u2019 of Imperfection\u2014Invisible blackness and the one-drop rule: An interdisciplinary approach to examining Plessy v. Ferguson and Jane Doe v. State of Louisiana"},"content":{"rendered":"

One \u2018Speck\u2019 of Imperfection\u2014Invisible blackness and the one-drop rule: An interdisciplinary approach to examining <\/a><\/strong><\/em>Plessy v. Ferguson<\/a><\/strong> and <\/a><\/strong><\/em>Jane Doe v. State of Louisiana<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Indiana University
\n2008
\n371 pages
\nPublication Number: AAT 3315914
\nISBN: 9780549675372<\/p>\n

Erica Faye Cooper<\/strong><\/p>\n

Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy<\/em><\/p>\n

By 1920 virtually every state legislature had adopted “one-drop<\/a>” laws. These laws were important because they served as the means for determining racial identity in the United States throughout the 20th century. In the past, scholars focus on either the social or legal history of the one-drop rule<\/a>. Despite the exhaustive social and legal historical accounts, I argue that the “history” of the one-drop rule is incomplete without a rhetorical history. My findings suggest that a rhetorical history of the one-drop rule is vital because it explores how the doctrine emerged in legal and social discourse. In addition, a rhetorical history also uncovers the persuasive strategies used by rhetors to reinforce racist ideology.<\/p>\n

In this dissertation, I found that the one-drop rule occupied a significant role in judicial rhetoric through the persuasive strategies of judicial actors\u2014court justices and lawyers. I revealed that their language choices created a pseudo “racial” reality that was characterized by a rigid black-white racial binary. This “false” reality functioned persuasively to obscure the racial diversity that actually existed in the United States during specific moments in time. Using Critical Race Theory<\/a> from legal studies and McGee’s notion of the “ideograph<\/a>” from critical rhetorical theory, I examined the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Plessy v. Ferguson<\/a><\/em> (1896) and the Court of Appeals’ holding in Jane Doe v. State of Louisiana<\/a><\/em> (1985). My findings show that such terms as “white,” “black,” and the “one-drop rule” were used by lawyers and court justices in disputes involving racial identity and legal rights beginning in 1896. In both cases, the one-drop ideograph dominated discussions regarding who was “black” or “white.” Based on its ideographic<\/a> relationship with the one-drop rule, “black” was defined to include mixed and unmixed blacks as well as whites. Within this ideographic analysis, I describe how the notion of invisible blackness was rhetorically constructed from the language used by the court. The one-drop rule continues to influence legislation and social attitudes.<\/p>\n

Table of Contents<\/strong><\/p>\n